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ABSTRACT 
Home financing takes a large chunk of peoples‟ income.  As alternatives to conventional interest-
based home financing modes, several Islamic modes are currently in existence, the dominant 
among which are the al-Bay‟ Bithaman Ajil (BBA) and the Musharakah Mutanaqisah 
Partnership (MMP) contracts.  The BBA is a murabahah contract, based on buy-and-sell 
principle while the MMP consists of a musharakah (partnership) contract and an ijarah (rental) 
contract where the equity of the financier follows a diminishing balance method.  Scholars are 
consensus on the Shari‟ah permissibility of the MMP contract, but nonetheless, are not consensus 
on the permissibility of the BBA contract.  Middle Eastern scholars generally disapprove of the 
BBA, which on the contrary is popular in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei etc.  This paper is a 
theoretical paper that compares these two contracts for the financing of assets, from Islamic and 
economic perspectives.  The paper concludes that the MMP has several advantages over the BBA 
for the customer.  Apart from being consensus Shari‟ah-compliant, it can be made to avoid 
interest (riba) totally by means of using some rental or house price index while reducing the cost 
of homes and the duration of financing.  The balance of financing, at any point in time, never 
exceeds the original price of the asset, unlike under the BBA where it can.  When implemented 
through cooperatives, the MMP can also provide an investment avenue for members while not 
contributing to macroeconomic problems through the fractional reserve money creation process; 
and hence is argued to be consistent with the maqāsid al-Sharī‟ah.  The paper also provides a 
mathematical derivation note for the MMP. 
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MUSHARAKAH MUTANAQISAH AND Al-BAY’ BITHAMAN AJIL 
CONTRACTS AS MEANS FOR HOME OWNERSHIP: 
A CONCEPTUAL COMPARISON 
 
I.  Introduction 
 Home is a basic necessity for human life.  Everyone needs a shelter for rest, sleep, 
comfort and protection from sun and rain.  It is a place to dwell in comfort with family.  
Therefore, owning a good home is an aspiration of everyone.  People fulfill this need by building 
a home on their own, purchasing it or renting it from others.  Indeed, payment for home mortgage 
normally takes a good chunk of one‟s monthly income.  Conventional home mortgages are, of 
course, interest-based and forbidden in Islam.  Accordingly, Islamic financial institutions have 
introduced a number of Shari‟ah-compliant modes for home ownership, the dominant of which 
are the al-Bay‟ Bithaman Ajil (BBA) and the Musharakah Mutanaqisah Partnership (MMP) 
contracts.  The BBA is the popular concept in countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei 
whereas the MMP is widely practiced in the Middle East, United States, Canada, United 
Kingdom and Australia.  The Middle Eastern Shari‟ah scholars disapprove of the BBA contract, 
citing that it is similar to the conventional loans.  Indeed, theory of finance predicts that the 
Islamic modes like BBA to converge to its conventional counterpart due to the law-of-one-price 
(See Meera and Larbani 2004).  This convergence has caused Islamic finance to evolve greatly; 
from being a „profit-and-loss” banking to fixed-rate murabahah financing, and now towards a 
floating rate financing mode.  The Central Bank of Malaysia, for example, has approved a 
„floating-rate‟ BBA where the customer pays a monthly instalment amount that is on the higher 
end, but thereafter gets a rebate based on the prevailing market interest rate
1
. Indeed, many BBA 
customers have shown dissatisfaction over its implementation as they are have to make high 
monthly payments prior to receiving rebates which can cause cash-flow problems. 
 Caught without much choice, the widespread application of the BBA in this part of the 
world, has however, put customers as well bankers in jeopardy particularly during volatile 
economic conditions. This is because the BBA is similar to fixed rate „debt financing‟.  During 
the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, for example, when interest rates were soaring up, the Islamic 
banks were unable to react, thereby causing huge arbitrage opportunities
2
.  Additionally, this also 
caused liquidity and risk management problems.  Accordingly, Islamic banking and finance is 
                                                 
1
 Note that this makes the Islamic mode to be dependent on interest rate. It can also pose potential cashflow 
problems as the BBA selling contract obligates the customer to pay a higher monthly   installment prior to 
receiving rebates.  
2
 Indeed, this prompted the then Malaysian Finance Minister to suggest the possibility of making Islamic 
financing modes be based on variable rates (Business Times, April 22, 1998). 
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being forced to change further; to be one that is Shari‟ah-compliant and „friendly‟ to the customer 
while also bearing liquidity and other risks „comparable‟ to the conventional banking. 
 The objective of this paper is to make theoretical analyses between the BBA and the 
MMP contracts.  For the benefit of the interested readers, practitioners and teachers of Islamic 
banking and finance, the paper also provides a mathematical derivation note for the MMP 
contract. 
 
II.  The al-Bay Bithaman Ajil (BBA) Contract 
The BBA is basically a sale contract which provides the buyer the benefit of a deferred 
payment, whereby the deferred price of the sale object carries an additional profit. It is an 
extension of the murabahah (cost plus) contract, whereby the commodity exchanged is 
“delivered” immediately but the sale price (with profit) is paid in instalments, over a long period 
(the murabahah itself being generally for short periods).  While the BBA is widely used in 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and few other countries, it has been subjected to much controversy 
among the fuqaha worldwide with regards to its permissibility; where most of the Middle East 
scholars have rejected it. Even though some Shari‟ah councils have agreed on its permissibility, a 
guideline from the Council of Islamic Ideology (Pakistan) in its report on the elimination of 
interest states that
3
: 
 
However, although this mode of financing is understood to be permissible under 
the Shari‟ah, it would not be advisable to use it widely or indiscriminately in 
view of the danger attached to it of opening a back door for dealing on the basis 
of interest” 
 
In the conventional system, home financing is, of course, usually interest-based and is 
forbidden in Islam
4
.  The current BBA home financing, however, does not alter much the above 
equation.  Instead of charging the customer interest, financiers charge a profit derived through a 
buy-and-sell contract which is permitted in Islam
5
, but regretfully, the profit rate is dependent on 
                                                 
3
 The Council of Islamic Ideology Pakistan, (1977), Elimination of Interest from the Economy, Islamabad: 
Government of Pakistan. 
4
 Generally, a conventional mortgage is pegged against the bank‟s base lending rate (BLR) plus a spread, 
e.g. 6.4 % p.a. BLR plus 2.0% p.a. spread (that equals 8.4 % per annum). The price for the loan, thus, 
varies according to the changes in the BLR which depends on the country‟s economic conditions.  If, for 
example, the BLR moved to 6.7 % p.a, the mortgage rate is then revised to 8.7% p.a and so on.      
5
 This is based on the frequently quoted verse from the Holy Quran (al-Baqarah, 2:275) which states that 
Allah has permitted trade and forbidden riba. 
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the market interest rate due to arbitrage activities
6
.  Therefore, while the BBA is practiced as 
Shari‟ah compliant in some countries, it is, nonetheless, converging to the conventional mode 
where the computational formulas are similar to the conventional and where the profit rate tracks 
the market interest rate. 
 The current difference between the fixed-rate BBA and the conventional mode is that 
once the profit rate is fixed in the BBA, say at 7% per annum, it will remain the same for the 
entire duration of financing. This, in fact, causes problems for the financiers as it is difficult to 
estimate accurately the cost of funds and hence the appropriate profit rate over long periods like 
20 years, due to the volatility of economic conditions. This encourages customers to refinance 
their home from BBA to conventional during low interest periods and vice versa. 
 
2.1  Operational issues of BBA Home Financing  
BBA is a facility provided by the financier to assist the customer pay the cost of 
financing, e.g. a house, over the tenor of financing, e.g. 20 years, at a fixed rate determined by the 
financier. The financier initially buys the house from the customer (cost of financing amount) and 
sells it back to the customer, plus of its profit margin
7
.  
 As the seller of the property, the Shari‟ah requires the bank to hold ownership of the 
property and to hold all liabilities arising, including defects.  But currently, BBA documentations 
show that the bank merely acts as a financier rather than a seller and excludes itself of all 
liabilities.  This, of course, ignores the Shari‟ah principle of “Al-Ghorm bil Ghonm” (no reward 
without risk), and “Al-Kharaj bil Daman” (any benefit must be accompanied with liability), 
thereby rendering the BBA profit to be implicated with riba. 
 The issue of concern here is the availability of iwad (counter value) in BBA financing. 
According to Rosly (2005), the Qur‟an uses trade (al-bay) because the profit generated from 
trading incorporates risk-taking, while the contractual profit from loan transactions (riba) is risk-
free. It further asserts that al-bay implies the existence of iwad required by the Shari‟ah to be a 
                                                 
6
 Which Shaikh Nizam Yaquby and Muhammad Taqi Usmani, in a 1998 fatwa, approve of so long such 
interest-based benchmarks do not render the contract on a variable rate. 
7
 Indeed, therefore the BBA generally also involves a bay al-inah contract that is disapproved by all 
schools except the Shafi‟e school that permitted it with abhorrence (See Mustafa Omar Mohammed, 
Islamic Financial Contracts (Module 2), Fiqh Muamalat Course Material, International Islamic University 
Malaysia, p.17).  Furthermore, it is important to note that most if not all Islamic banks operate under the 
fractional reserve system.  This means that Islamic banks, just like their conventional counterparts, also 
create fiat money out of nothing but disburse this newly created money using Islamic financing modes.  
Meera and Larbani (2004) and others have questioned the Shari‟ah compliance of fiat money creation 
itself, an issue on which the Shari‟ah scholars are still silent about. 
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lawful profit in Islam. Three elements of iwad that should exist are risk (ghorm), work and effort 
(kasb) and liability (daman). 
 Iwad is the basic trait or the conditio sine quo non of a halal or lawful   sale   (al-bay), 
because a sale is necessarily an exchange of value against an equitable return and compensation 
for the goods or services exchanged
8
.  According to Ibn al-„Arabi (d.543H/1148), every increase 
which is without an iwad or equal counter value, is riba. Iwad is the necessary requirement to be 
fulfilled in trading (al-bay) as it brings along a sense of equity and justice into a business that 
rendered it superior to an interest-bearing system. 
 Rosly (2005) also opined that there is no risk taking in the current BBA financing, and, 
hence, does not merit the Qur‟anic concept of al-bay. Daman (liability) should also exist in a 
trading transaction whereby the supplier provides guarantees on the goods sold. However in the 
current BBA home financing, the customer is forced to face the financial burden of paying the for 
the house even before it is completed, as he has engaged in a „debt contract‟ with the bank at the 
outset.  By ignoring the concept of iwad, the BBA contract is not seen as conforming to the 
maqasid al-Shari‟ah that removes hardship (raf‟ al-haraj) and preventing harm (daf‟ al-darar) in 
the economic sphere, thereby leaving the welfare of people unprotected – a possible crime when 
the transaction is done under an Islamic label
9
. 
Another issue that arises from the long-term BBA financing is the mismatching of the 
BBA funds against its short-term deposit tenor. Whilst conventional financing has the ability to 
address this mismatch in the cost of funds through the variable interest rate (BLR + a spread), 
BBA financing cannot do this since customers are charged a fixed profit rate for the entire period 
of financing
10
.  
 
2.2 Example of a al-Bay Bithaman Ajil (BBA) Financing 
Consider the following example
11
.  Assume that a customer wishes to buy a house priced 
at RM200, 000.  The customer puts a down-payment of 10 percent, i.e. RM20, 000 and finances 
the remaining 80 percent, i.e. RM180, 000 using the BBA method.  Also assume that the Annual 
Profit Rate (APR) charged by the bank is 10 percent per annum and the duration of financing is 
                                                 
8
 Rosly (2005), p.40. 
9
 See Bilal Farid et.al. 
10
 The proposed floating-rate BBA may solve this mismatch problem. 
11
 A condition that existed in a locality in Malaysia in 1996. 
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for 20 years.  The Islamic bank would first buy the house from the customer for RM180, 000 and 
then sell it back to him at a profit, with deferred payments over the 20-year period
12
.    
The monthly payment for the above financing is RM1, 737.04
13
 , payable for 240 months 
which adds up to RM416, 889.35 in total.  The difference between this figure and the original 
financing of RM180, 000 which equals RM236, 889.35 is the total profit for the Islamic bank 
from this transaction.  The profit of RM236, 889.35 is capitalized upfront in the BBA mode, 
unlike under the conventional mortgage, where the interest due is not recognized until the elapse 
of time.  One important difference of the BBA compared with the MMP and the conventional 
mortgage is that of the balance of financing remaining before the expiry of the duration of 
financing.  For our example, the BBA balance after 10 years (i.e. after 120 payments) is the total 
of the remaining 120 payments, i.e. RM208, 444.80 whereas under conventional mortgage, this 
amount would represent the total interest paid for the loan over the 20-year period. The Islamic 
bank, however, may give some rebate for the early repayment, but the amount of rebate is 
determined at the discretion of the bank.  Since the selling price is a fixed price, indeed, Shari‟ah 
prohibits the rebate to be stated as part of the contract. Note that even after ten years of 
repayment, the balance under the BBA mode can even exceed the original financing of 
RM180,000
14
 (See Figure 1).    Nevertheless, considering all the socio-economic effects of fiat 
money, we regretfully assert that Islamic banking within the fractional reserve system can, 
indeed, be very damaging to the economy
15
.     
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 It is important to note that Islamic banks and conventional banks that operate under the fractional reserve 
system would, indeed, create this RM180, 000 out of nothing.  This mechanism actually adds new money 
into the economic system without reducing the total deposits of the depositors. 
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 Computed using the standard formula for present value of annuities, i.e. 
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 This happens neither under the conventional mortgage nor the MMP as will be illustrated later, where the 
balance of financing, at any point in time, never exceeds the principal amount.  Therefore, under fractional 
reserve banking system where both the conventional and Islamic banks create money out of nothing, the 
Islamic mode is, indeed, very attractive to the bankers. Infact, Citicorp, a conventional bank, is reported as 
the largest Islamic banking services provider in the world in terms of transactions (The Asian Wall Street 
Journal, 3 May, 2005, p.1). 
15
 See Meera (2002, 2004) for a discussion on the socio-economic implications of fiat money creation and 
for a demonstration why both Islamic and conventional banking systems would ultimately converge, i.e. 
become equal, due to arbitraging between both the banking systems.  This implies that the global Islamic 
mode of financing would soon converge into the floating rate market.  Meera and Larbani (2005) argued 
that the seigniorage of fiat money is, indeed, a profound riba, which the Sharī‟ah scholars must urgently 
address. 
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Figure 1 
Islamic Banking and Conventional Banking under Fractional Reserve System 
 
Time    0       1      120    240 (20 yrs) 
 
PV= 180,000     1737.04 ……………………………………………….     1737.04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While both the Islamic bank and the conventional bank create the original principal 
amounts through fractional reserve banking system (i.e. loans given out do not really reduce the 
deposits of the depositors), a customer owes more money in the Islamic mode than the 
conventional mode at any time thereafter until the „loan‟ is settled.  This fact alone is very 
attractive for even the conventional bankers to provide Islamic mode financing.  But, nonetheless, 
considering the serious negative socio-economic implications of fiat money-based fractional 
reserve banking, we regretfully conclude that Islamic banking under fractional reserve system is 
likely to accelerate the said effects –default rates, transfer of wealth and sovereignty etc. (See 
Meera 2004) 
 
III. The Musharakah Mutanaqisah Partnership (MMP) Concept 
The Musharakah Mutanaqisah Partnership (MMP) contract, on the other hand, is based 
on a diminishing partnership concept.  Here, there are two portions to the contract.  First, the 
customer enters into a partnership (musharakah) under the concept of „Shirkat-al-Milik‟ (joint 
ownership) agreement with the bank. Customer pays, for example, 10% as the initial share to co-
own the house whilst the bank provides for the balance of 90%. The customer will then gradually 
redeem the financier‟s 90% share at an agreed portion periodically until the house is fully owned 
by the customer.  Second, the bank leases its share (90%) in the house ownership to the customer 
under the concept of ijarah, i.e. by charging rent; and the customer agrees to pay the rental to the 
bank for using its share of the property. The periodic rental amounts will be jointly shared 
between the customer and the bank according to the percentage share holding at the particular 
times which keeps changing as the customer redeems the financier‟s share.  The customer‟s share 
Both the Islamic Bank and 
the Conventional Bank 
create the RM180, 000 out of 
nothing through the 
fractional reserve banking 
system 
The remaining balance after 10 
years‟ of monthly payments is 
RM208,444.80 in the BBA mode 
while it is only RM131,443.76 in 
the conventional mode 
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ratio would increase after each rental payment due to the periodic redemption until eventually 
fully owned by the customer. 
Bendjilali and Khan (1995) and Muhammad Taqi Usmani basically agreed on the 
implementation process of Musharakah Mutanaqisah Partnership. They agreed that the product 
could help the people to less rely on other financing facilities such as the BBA, Murabahah etc.  
The scholars agreed that it is best to implement Musharakah Mutanaqisah Partnership for house 
financing or machinery financing whereby both assets can be leased out according to agreed 
rental.  Joint ownership of a house or machinery is accepted by all schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence since the financier sells its shares to the customer (See Taqi Usmani 2002). The 
concept of diminishing musharakah is not confined to home ownership only. It can also be 
applied to other forms of acquiring assets such as buying a car or a taxi for earning income by 
using it as a hired vehicle. Creating joint ownership in the form of Shirkah al-Milk is allowed in 
the Shar‟iah16.   
Consider an example, where the customer wants to purchase a taxi to transport 
passengers, but can only afford 20% of the purchase price. The financier participates by providing 
the balance 80% of the share. The profit derived from the rental is shared between them based on 
the capital contribution.  
The financier‟s share is divided into eight units. At the end of three months (one quarter), 
for example, the customer purchases one unit from the financier. Hence, the financier‟s share gets 
reduced to 70% while the customer‟s share increased to 30%. Due to the now higher proportion 
of share ownership, the customer will be entitled to a higher profit ratio. This process will go on 
until after the expiry of two years (eight quarters), whereby the whole taxi will be owned by the 
customer.          
 
3.1 Example of a Musharakah Mutanaqisah Partnership (MMP) Financing 
Consider the same example as for the BBA concept where a customer wishes to buy a 
house priced at RM200, 000.  Let us assume again that the customer pays 10 percent of the price, 
i.e. RM20, 000, the financier puts the remaining 80 percent, i.e. RM180, 000 and that the average 
rental for similar homes in the locality is agreed upon between the two parties to be RM1, 000 per 
month.  And the customer wishes to add another RM289.58 monthly
17
 in order to redeem the 
                                                 
16 Ashraf Usmani (2002), p.116 
17
 Equation (3) in the Mathematical Derivation for Musharakah Mutanaqisah Partnership in the Appendix 
is used to obtain this amount of RM289.58. 
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financier‟s share in 20 years.  This gives, the total monthly payment as RM1,289.58.  Table 1 
below provides the schedule for the MMP contract: 
 
Table 1 
Payments Schedule for Musharakah Mutanaqisah Partnership
18
 
     Rental Division    
Month 
Monthly 
Rent 
(RM) 
Monthly 
Redemption 
(RM) 
Total 
Payment 
(RM) 
Customer’s 
Ratio 
Customer Financier 
Customer’s 
Equity 
(RM) 
Financier’s 
Equity  
(RM) 
Financier’s 
Cashflow 
(RM) 
 A B C=A+B D E F G H  
0    0.10000   20,000.00 180,000 (180,000) 
1 1,000 289.58 1,289.58 0.10195 100.00 900.00 20,389.58 179,610.4 1,289.58 
2 1,000 289.58 1,289.58 0.10391 101.95 * 898.05 20,781.11 179,218.9 1,289.58 
3 1,000 289.58 1,289.58 0.10587 103.91 896.09 21,174.59 178,825.4 1,289.58 
4 1,000 289.58 1,289.58 0.10785 105.87 894.13 21,570.05 178,430.0 1,289.58 
5 1,000 289.58 1,289.58 0.10984 107.85 892.15 21,967.48 178,032.5 1,289.58 
6 1,000 289.58 1,289.58 0.11183 109.84 890.16 22,366.89 177,633.1 1,289.58 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
240 1,000 289.58 1,289.58 1.00000 993.59 6.41 200,000 0 1,289.58 
                          Total =  RM309,499.20                 IRR =  6% 
 
Rental Distribution i.e.   E-2(Customer‟s) = 20,389.58 X 
000,200
000,1
= RM 101.95*;   F – 2 (Bank‟s) RM 898.05                                                                                       
 G-1  Customer‟s Equity = RM 20,000 + RM 289.58 + RM 100 = RM 20,389.58 
 H-1 Bank‟s Equity = RM 200,000 – RM 20,389.60 = RM 179,610.40  
 
Notice that while the amount to be paid monthly was RM1737.04 under the BBA concept, the 
monthly amount needed under MMP is only RM1, 289.58.  Therefore, the customer saves 
RM447.46 monthly but acquires the home also in 20 years.  Indeed, if the customer pays 
RM1,737.04 for the MMP mode as in the BBA, then the customer can own the home in 12 years 
                                                 
18
 An Excel spreadsheet that produces similar schedules for MMP computations is available from the 
authors upon request. 
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3 months
19
, i.e. saving about 8 years of monthly payments!  Table 2 below provides a comparison 
for financing the home using the conventional, BBA and MMP methods. 
 
Table 2 
Comparison between Conventional Loan, BBA and MMP 
    
Price of house = 
RM200,000 
Customer puts = 
RM20,000 
Financier provide = 
RM180,000 
Monthly Rental = 
RM1,000 
    
 
APR* = 10% APR = 10% 
    
APR = 6 % 
 Conventional Loan BBA MMP 
Monthly payment 1737.04 1737.04 1289.58 
Total Payment 
in 20 years 
416,889.60 416,889.60 309,499.20 
Total Interest/ 
Profit to Bank 
236,889.60 236,889.60 129,499.20 
APR 10% 10% 6% 
Balance after 10 years 131,443.76 208,444.68 116,156.56 
  
From Table 2, it is obvious that so long the APRs are the same the total interest in the 
conventional equals the total profit in the BBA.  But when customer wants to settle the financing 
earlier, say after 10 years, the loan balance under the BBA is always higher than under the 
conventional loan.  The balance under the conventional is much lower because here the balance is 
the present value of the remaining 120 payments whereas under the BBA it is simply the monthly 
payment times 120 (i.e. under BBA the total profit for the twenty years is capitalized upfront).  
Nonetheless, the bank may give a rebate for early settlement which is decided at its discretion.  
Nevertheless, the total payments and loan balances are lowest in the MMP among the three 
financing methods.  The mathematical derivation for MMP in the Appendix shows that the return 
to the MMP is solely determined by the rental rate, which in this case is 0.5% per month 
(accordingly the APR is 6%)
20
.  Interestingly, this return to the financier is neither determined by 
the initial capital provided by the financier nor the duration of the contract which is usual under 
debt financing.  The return is solely but determined by the rental alone as a percentage of the 
                                                 
19
 Obtained using Equation (2) in the Appendix. 
20
 The annual percentage rate (APR) in the MMP is determined by the rental rate, i.e. the annual rent 
divided by the original price of the house.  In our example, it is (RM1,000 x 12)/200,000 x 100% = 6%.  
See equation 5 in the Appendix. 
 10 
house price.  Such as the case, financiers of MMP would be tempted to finance only homes with 
high rental rates, whereas it would be in the interest of the customers to negotiate for low rentals.  
If, in our example, the rental rate for the MMP equals an APR of 10 percent (i.e. where the rental 
is RM1,666.67 per month) then, indeed, the „amortization‟ schedule for all the three methods will 
be the same (though they differ conceptually).  But one important difference would still remain, 
i.e. the balance of financing before expiry of the contract.  The balance under the conventional 
loan and MMP would be the same while the balance under BBA would still be higher.  This is 
because the conventional and MMP methods follow a diminishing balance schedule.  Therefore, 
the balance under conventional and MMP can never exceed the financiers original contribution, 
but under the BBA it can
21
. 
 
 Operational Issues of MMP Home Financing 
 
From the foregoing argument, it is obvious that the MMP may not be attractive to the 
bankers compared to the BBA contract because rarely the annual rental rate equals 10 percent 
which means ten years‟ rental equals the original price of the house.  This can be deduced from 
the fact that mortgages generally exceed ten years.  The norm in Malaysia is about 20 to 25 years.  
Indeed, two-generation mortgages have even been proposed (Berita Harian, 26 January 2005).  
Hence, the MMP is suited to be practiced, for example, by housing cooperatives where the funds 
are provided by the members for the benefit of the members themselves.  While providing 
cheaper housing for members, the MMP also provides returns to the investing members in the 
form of rentals and sale of properties.  Indeed, observations show that globally the MMP is being 
successfully practiced in a cooperative setting.  Some examples of these are discussed in Section 
 
3.3. An additional benefit of implementing the MMP by housing cooperatives is that it  
avoids new money creation as in the fractional reserve banking.  By avoiding money creation 
and operating under a profit-and-loss sharing setting, the MMP can bring about a harmonious 
balance between the monetary sector and the real economy and thereby is likely to contribute 
towards the achievement of the Maqasid al-Shari‟ah. 
Nonetheless, the MMP is not going to be free from operational problems. For example, 
theoretically the rate of return to MMP is determined by the rental rate based on the market rental 
value, determined by the location and not by market interest rates. As time goes by, the rental 
                                                 
21
 As in the above example where after 10 years of payments, the balance under BBA is RM208,444.68 
which exceeds the original amount of RM180,000! 
 11 
value can therefore change, increasing in most cases.  Customers need to be advised   that they 
would have to pay different monthly rentals (higher or lower) based on market price within the 
period of tenure reflecting real market condition in place of interest rate. 
Some quarters suggested the use of market interest rate, e.g. the LIBOR, BLR etc, as the 
benchmark.  Adopting this would, of course, render the MMP similar to floating-rate 
conventional financing since the mathematical formulas for the MMP turn out to be similar to the 
conventional, as shown in the Appendix (but with interest replaced with rental).  Since many real-
estate studies have shown the property price as a significant variable determining the rent, we 
propose some kind of real estate index, like the House Price Index in the Malaysian case
22
 be 
used as the benchmark.  As Shaikh Nizam Yacuby and Muhammad Taqi Usmani mentioned in 
their 1998 fatwa: 
 
It is always preferable not to use a benchmark normally used in 
interest-based transactions, so that an Islamic transaction may not 
have resemblance with an interest-based transaction. 
 
Hence, unlike the interest rate, a house price index will also be directly linked to the usufruct of 
the asset
23
.  To derive at the monthly rental equation
24
, we collected   location of property (x1) 
and property values (x2) as the independent variables involving 70 single storey houses in seven 
regions
25
 within 130 kilometer radius of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.  SPSS technique is used to        
regress the two variables mentioned to obtain the monthly rental. The result of our study showed 
that there is negative relationship between distance and monthly rental i.e. the further distance 
from Kuala Lumpur, the lower the rental.  However, there is a positive relationship between 
values of property and monthly rental (y=138.876-1.208 x1 + 0.002846x2). The value of the 
correlation coefficient R = 0.943 shows that the linear dependence of the rental on the two 
variables are very strong.  This equation can in turn be used to predict monthly rental of a 
property given its distance (x1) and value (x2). Hence for a house located 15 km away from 
Kuala Lumpur valued at RM 200,000, the monthly rental value is computed as follows:- 
 RM 689.96       = 138.876 – 1.208 (15 km) + 0.002846 (200,000)  
 
                                                 
22
 The Malaysian House Price Index is computed and released by the Valuation & Property Services 
Department, Ministry of Finance, and Malaysia.  See www.jpph.gov.my 
23
 The index value differs according to locality. 
24
 y(monthly rental) = a0(constant)  + a1 x1(location of property) + a2 x2(value of property)  
25
 These regions are Gombak, Petaling, Hulu Langat, Klang, Hulu Selangor, Kuala Selangor and 
Sabak Bernam. 
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The implementation of MMP may also require tax regulations to be amended to allow only rental 
charges contributing to profit be treated as income to the bank i.e. rental charges contributing to 
customer‟s equity must no be taxable26.  Similarly, land laws may also need to be amended so as 
to allow banks to become principal co-owners of properties. 
 Other practical issues would include issues like what happens if the customer fails to 
make the rental payments or wants to sell-off the property before fully owning it etc.  Also issues 
about wear and tear, damages to the property due to natural calamities etc. need to be agreed 
upon.  Such issues can, of course, be addressed and incorporated into the MMP contract but, 
nevertheless, are issues that need to be sorted out. 
 
3.3 Current Practices of MMP-type Home Ownership Schemes 
The Musharakah Mutanaqisah concepts have been adopted by a number of Islamic 
financial services providers worldwide. Successful cooperative-type models include the Islamic 
Housing Cooperative (Canada), Ansar Cooperative Housing (Canada) and the Ansar Housing 
Limited (U.K). 
  The highly successful Islamic Cooperative Housing Corporation (ICHC) based in 
Toronto, Canada was established in 1981 out of necessity to avoid the Muslim community from 
engaging in riba. It is based on an equity model different from the traditional debt-based 
mortgage. To join the co-operative, members buy shares in a single equity pool. Once a member 
accumulates enough shares, the Co-op buys a house that his family can live in while paying a 
proportional rent to the Co-op. Thereon, members are required to increase their ownership by 
investing more money in the Co-op shares. As they do so, the rent goes down in the same 
proportion until the payments phase out. Eventually, the home buyer surrenders the shares to the 
Co-op and the Co-op transfers the title. It was reported that under this arrangement, some of their 
members achieved 100% ownership in seven and half years as there is flexibility to increase 
ownership at any time.   
The ICHC model was approved by the renowned scholar Muhammad Taqi Usmani and 
was adopted by the Ansar Housing Limited (AHL) of the U.K. The AHL uses the Shared 
Ownership Scheme (S.O.S) based on the Ijarah (rental) mechanism.  This method is very flexible 
and more importantly, equitable to both parties concerned. The monthly repayment includes two 
elements - a rent portion and a buy-back of additional share of the house. Rent is paid by the 
occupant on the share of the house owned by the Ansar Housing Ltd. As the occupant increases 
his share of the house each month the rent decreases accordingly. 
                                                 
26
 See Bilal Farid et.al, p16. 
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There are also financial institutions that have adopted the Ijarah and Musharakah 
Mutanaqisah models in the U.S., Pakistan and United Kingdom. The successful models in the 
U.S. include those by the LARIBA Finance House in Pasadena, California and the Guidance 
Financial Group in Reston, Virginia.  The LARIBA Finance House is the oldest of the 
organizations and was originally funded primarily by the Muslims in the U.S.  The Guidance 
Financial Group also has origins in the Muslim community and has been offering products for the 
past two years. Both LARIBA and Guidance have licenses to sell their products in nearly every 
state in the U.S.    
   According to Dr Yahia Abdul Rahman, founder of LARIBA Finance House, “Many 
American-Muslim families have stayed out of the housing market for years because they are not 
allowed by Islamic jurisprudence to pay, receive or be charged interest”. Freddie Mac has 
invested an estimated US$1 million in contracts from the finance house under an agreement that 
makes it the nation‟s first Islamic financial institution to achieve Freddie Mac Seller/Service 
status. The LARIBA model uses standard real estate financing documents, in accordance with 
state and local laws. The key to the model is an agreement between LARIBA and the prospective 
homeowner that establishes jointly negotiated maximum monthly payments based on the 
property‟s sale price and fair rental value in a lease-to-purchase (LTP) with declining equity 
based on the Ijara Wa Iqtina Musharakah concept. Due to high demand, LARIBA has entered 
into a partnership with Fannie Mae (FNM/NYSE), the nation‟s largest source of financing for 
home mortgages that has committed US$10 million, to enable more American-Muslim families to 
purchase homes in the U.S. while abiding by the Islamic religious prohibition against usury.  
Under the LTP program, LARIBA would purchase the property with its customers and 
agrees to sell its shares/units to them. The program allows customers to build equity through 
monthly payments that combine principal with rent. The rent which is tax-deductible is based on 
the going market rate agreed upon by both LARIBA and the customer. The rental component is a 
function of a fair rental value of the property as determined by both the company and home 
buyer‟s research on rental values in the area of the financed property.  The installment purchase 
component represents the amount required each month to purchase back the amount advanced by 
LARIBA over the life of the financing with no additional increase or interest. This component is 
referred to as Return of Capital. The home buyer also pays a percentage of the fair rental value 
based on the equity share of the company referred to as Return on Capital. Although monthly 
payments are fixed for the term of the financing, the rental component that accrues to LARIBA 
decreases each month as the finance house‟s equity share declines.  
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In Pakistan, Meezan Bank‟s “Easy Home” scheme was the first Islamic home financing 
facility. It is free from riba and in a Shari‟ah-compliant housing facility approved by the 
renowned Shari‟ah Supervisory Board. It utilizes the Musharakah Mutanaqisah concept where 
the bank jointly owns the property with the customer. The bank provides up to 85% of 
participation in share ownership of the house. The customer agrees to pay the monthly payment to 
the Bank of which a component is for the rent and another to redeem the equity share. The total 
monthly payment is reduced regularly as share in the property grows.  The customer becomes the 
sole owner of the property after full investment of the shares on the property has been made. This 
flexible financing has the benefit of high financing amounts, maximum financing against property 
value, flexible prepayments with affordable and competitive monthly payment plan with a 
regularly reducing rental amount. 
There are two financial institutions that have adopted the Musharakah Mutanaqisah 
model in the United Kingdom and Ireland, i.e. the Lloyds TSB and Bristol & West.  Their 
partnership with the Arab Banking Corporation (ABC) resulted in alburaq Shari‟ah-compliant 
home financing. Customers of alburaq can buy residential property over any period up to 25 
years and obtain finance up to 90% of the property value. Customers can make full payment at 
any time and additional payments at each rent review. They can also sell the property as and 
when they wish. The modus operandi is similar to the Musharakah Mutanaqisah described above 
whereby the customer and bank will each contribute towards purchase of the home and the 
customer will make periodic installments through which the bank will sell its share to the 
customer. With each payment installment, the bank‟s share in the property will decrease while the 
customer‟s increase. The bank will charge the customer rent for the use of its share of the 
property, the rent being calculated according to the respective shares.  
Lloyds TSB launched its home finance plan based on the concept of Musharakah 
Mutanaqisah recently in March 2005, serving two million Muslims in Britain.  The bank buys a 
home for the customer, who then pays the purchase price in monthly installments. As the bank is 
the legal owner of the home, the customer also pays a monthly rent, which decreases as the 
customer buys the bank‟s share of the property. The customer will eventually buy out the bank‟s 
share at which point ownership is transferred from the customer to the bank. The facility is 
currently piloted in selected branches. 
 
 
 
   
 15 
IV The Differences between the BBA and the MMP Contracts 
In summary, the main differences between the joint ownership MMP and debt-type BBA 
financing are as follows:- 
1. There are two separate contracts under the MMP method. The first is a musharakah 
where the client is a partner and the second one is an ijarah which involves the leasing of 
the property. The BBA, on the contrary, follows the murabahah concept of buying and 
selling of property. 
2. Under BBA, the selling price of the house does not reflect the market value since the 
mark-up for the deferred payment is quite substantial.  On the contrary, the value of the 
house under MMP always reflects the market price and the rental are determined by the 
market rental values. 
3.  The return to the BBA is based on a fixed selling price (that uses the prevailing interest 
rate as the benchmark). But under MMP, the financer need not be tied to a fixed profit 
rate throughout the financing tenor. This is because the rental rate can be revised 
periodically to reflect current market conditions. Indeed, as argued earlier, the rental can 
be tied to some economic variables like Rental Index, House Price Index etc. 
4. The financier can manage the liquidity risks better as rental payments can be adjusted at 
the end of each subcontract period. This is not possible under the current fixed-rate BBA 
as the profit rate is a constant throughout the entire tenor of financing.  
5. Even compared with a floating-rate BBA, the MMP still differs in the balance of 
financing at any point in time before the end of the contract.  Under MMP the balance 
can never be larger than the original price/finance of the house.  Rebates for early 
redemption under BBA cannot be specifically stated in the contract. 
6. The MMP is a more flexible financing structure than the BBA as the customer can own 
the property earlier by redeeming faster the principal sum of the financier, without the 
need to compute rebates
27
 as in BBA.  
7. In the event of payment defaults, the penalty charges under BBA can be challenged, 
while under MMP, defaults will cause the equity of financier to remain constant and 
therefore entitled to higher rental portions when payments made later. 
8. Currently many customers opine that the BBA is similar to the conventional loan with 
some “disadvantages” for the customer particularly for early redemptions. 
9. The MMP is accepted internationally as Shari‟ah-compliant whereas the BBA is 
recognized predominantly in the east, i.e. in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei etc. 
                                                 
27
 Which is at the discretion of the bank since fixing the rebate upfront is not allowed in Shari‟ah. 
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V. Conclusion  
This paper made a comparative analysis between the al-Bay Bithaman Ajil (BBA) and 
Musharakah Mutanaqisah Partnership (MMP) contracts as means for home ownership.  While a 
home is basic necessity, it consumes a large chunk of peoples‟ income for long periods.  In the 
present interest-based fiat monetary system, owning a home is increasingly becoming 
burdensome.  Indeed, mortgages are one of the significant causes of bad debts and bankruptcies.  
While price of homes keep rising, the mortgage duration also keep rising, till two-generation 
mortgages are even being talked about. 
 In this regard, this paper attempted to argue in favour of the MMP as a better alternative 
to the conventional mortgage and the Islamic BBA.  The BBA is a murabahah contract that is 
based on a buy-and-sell principle while the MMP consists of a musharakah (partnership) contract 
and an ijarah (rental) contract where the equity of the financier follows a diminishing balance 
method.  Shari‟ah scholars are consensus on the permissibility of the MMP contract 
internationally, but only scholars in the east generally permit the BBA contract.  The paper 
concludes that the MMP has several advantages over the BBA for the customer.  Apart from 
being consensus Shari‟ah-compliant, it can be made to avoid interest (riba) totally and can reduce 
the cost of homes and the duration of financing.  The balance of finance, at any point in time, 
never exceeds the original price of the asset, unlike under the BBA where it can. 
 When a home is purchased from a developer and financed using the present conventional 
or Islamic BBA, the customer would end up paying about four times the original cost (both the 
developer and the bank are assumed to make a gross 100 percent mark-up).  This, undoubtedly, 
can burden particularly the low income group.  But, Musharakah Mutanaqisah Partnership is in 
line with the objectives of Shari‟ah as it allows people to own homes with limited initial capital.  
In doing so, it promotes the welfare of the people.  Anything that protects or promotes these is 
considered as serving the maslahah and hence desirable
28
.  As al-Ghazzali remarked
29
: 
 
“The very objectives of the Shari‟ah are to promote the welfare of the people, 
which lies in safeguarding their faith, their life, their intellect, their posterity and 
their wealth. Whatever ensures the safeguarding of these five serves public 
interest and is desirable” 
 
                                                 
28
 Chapra (1992). 
29
 Ibid, p1. 
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Although  MMP may be appear to be less attractive compared to  BBA, it is  still a viable  
alternative for home financing as more Islamic financial institutions are now moving towards 
developing  products  that reflect true spiritual values in line with the  Maqasid al-Shari‟ah. 
   MMP is indeed viable through a cooperatives setting as it provide an investment avenue 
for cooperative members to substantially reducing the price of house and the duration of 
financing.  The concept has a positive impact on the economy and reduces inflation as no 
additional money is created in the system compared to debt-financing, as currently done under the 
fractional reserve banking system. 
The MMP is just and fair compared to the conventional loan and the BBA as there is no 
interest charge or „advanced‟ profit involved in the Musharakah Mutanaqisah Partnership 
contract. It is purely based on rental payments of property and the redeeming of the financier‟s 
shares. As a benchmark, the paper suggested the use of a Rental Index or House Price Index in 
determining the rental to be charged for each specified ijarah contract period. 
The MMP concept is a viable alternative to the conventional floating rate financing since 
the rental rate can be adjusted if there are fluctuations in the economy. Hence, it is more flexible, 
wherein the Islamic bank will not be faced with too many uncertainties due to variations in 
economic conditions. As for the society, the MMP brings stability into the economy by 
promoting positive partnership instead of negative indebtedness thus assisting in the equitable 
distribution of society‟s wealth; minimizing the large number of debt defaults and bankruptcies 
that are observed in the current financial system.                                                                                                                                                       
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Appendix 
Musharakah Mutanaqisah Partnership 
A Mathematical Derivation Note 
 
P = Price of asset, e.g. a home 
B0 = Financier‟s contribution into the partnership 
C0 = Customer‟s contribution into the partnership 
Therefore, 00 CBP  
R = Periodic rental, eg. monthly 
A = Additional periodic payment by customer to redeem the financier‟s equity faster 
M = R + A, is therefore, the total periodic payment 
Let iC = the customer‟s equity (ownership) of the asset in period i 
Let the proportion of customer‟s equity in period i,  
P
C
r ii  
Therefore, 
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. 
ARrCC nnn 11  
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. 
. 
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and, of course, the proportion of the customer‟s equity in the nth period is  
P
C
r nn  
Rewriting equation (1), the number of periods taken by the customer to fully own the house is 
given by, where PCn , 
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Once the rental, R, has been determined and the customer has decided on the period of 
partnership, i.e. the n, then the periodic amount the customer has to top up additionally is given 
by 
1)1(
)1( 0
n
n
x
CxPx
A        (3) 
and, the formula for determining the periodic payment is given by 
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which, interestingly, is similar to the normal annuity formula used for computing the payment in 
conventional loan calculations
30
.  Hence, mathematically, the normal annuity formula can also be 
used for Mushārakah Mutanākisah calculations, but the periodic interest rate is replaced by the 
rental rate,
P
R
x .  Indeed then, the periodic rate of return for Mushārakah Mutanākisah Partnership is 
solely determined by the rental rate, 
P
R
x .  Therefore, the  
 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) to bank 
P
R
       (5) 
 
Also, 
 
Total payment made to financier = Mn         (6) 
 
Total profit to financier = 0BMn         (7) 
 
 
Note:  Since the rate of return (IRR) for the financier is solely determined by the rental 
rate,
P
R
x , irrespective of the initial capital provided by the financier ( 0B  ) and/or the 
duration of the partnership ( n ), the financier may be tempt to finance only homes with 
high rental values; while it is in the interest of the customers to negotiate for low rentals.  
At the extreme, if the rental is nil, then the Mushārakah Mutanākisah financing will 
become similar to Qard al-Hassan. 
 
 
                                                 
30
 Please see footnote 13. 
